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THE FEDERAL AND STATE ROLES IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: A PROPOSAL 
FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE AND MORE EFFICIENT 
RELATIONSHIP 
LeRoy C.  Paddock** 
Before 1970, the responsibility for environmental enforcement 
had been the nearly exclusive domain of state and local govern- 
ments.' However, beginning with the passage of the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 19702 and continuing through the enactment of the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Li- 
ability Act3 in 1980, the federal enforcement role and federal influ- 
ence over state enforcement programs dramatically expanded. By 
the mid-1980's the federal government had assumed the dominant 
role in the enforcement of environmental lawe4 Not only did this 
change in the traditional~roles of the state and federal governments 
occur very rapidly, but it also occurred without a consistent set of 
principles controlling the appropriate role of state governments 
versus the federal government. Instead, the increasing federal 
domination of environmental enforcement programs of this era 
* B.A., American University 1965; J.D., University of Minnesota 1969. Mr. Hum- 
phrey was elected attorney general in 1982 and re-elected in 1986. 
** B.A., University of Minnesota 1970; J.D., University of Iowa 1977. Mr. Paddock 
was appointed special assistant attorney general in 1978 and assistant attorney general in 
1987. 
1. Federal involvement in environmental programs began with the Rivers and Har- 
bors Appropriations Act of 1899, ch. 425,30 Stat. 1121 (1899). Additional federal legislation 
was enacted in the 1950's and 1960's, but the scope of this legislation was relatively limited. 
See 1 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL L W§ 1.01, at 1-6 (1989). 
2. Pub. L. No. 91-604,84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. $0 7401-7642 
(1982)). 
3. Pub. L. No. 96-510,94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. $0 9601-9675 
(1982 & Supp. V 1987)). 
4. See 1 F. GRAD, supra note 1, § 1.03, at 1-19. 
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appeared to be a reaction to the slow response of state govern- 
ments in dealing with emerging environmental  problem^.^ 
An equally dramatic shift in enforcement responsibilities is 
evident in newer environmental programs such as the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act6 and the Medical 
Waste Tracking Act of 1988' where the major enforcement re- 
sponsibilities have been directly assigned to the states with little 
federal involvement. Here, too, the allocation of enforcement re- 
sponsibilities lacks any principled determination of the appropriate 
roles of the federal and the state governments. Rather, the allo- 
cation of responsibilities under these laws appears to be based 
largely on factors such as the lack of federal resources and the 
expanding number of regulated entities. 
Nearly twenty years have elapsed since the passage of the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970. This period has permitted 
experimentation with a variety of approaches to environmental 
enforcement. It has also produced significant tensions between the 
states and the federal government, and enforcement programs 
which, in many cases, do not produce optimal results. At least 
part of the reason for these problems has been the absence of a 
clear understanding of the appropriate roles of the states and the 
federal government in environmental enforcement. 
To allow the federal and state governments to work together 
better, to best utilize the limited resources available for enforce- 
ment, to minimize duplication of effort, and to help meet the 
rapidly expanding enforcement responsibilities of both states and 
the federal government, a clear set of principles for allocating 
enforcement responsibilities must be developed and utilized by 
Congress, the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
("EPA") and the states. These principles should include the 
following: 
1. States should adopt their own regulatory and enforcement au- 
thority to support federal regulatory programs that a state chooses 
to -manage. 
5. 1 F. GRAD, supra note 1, 8 1.03, at 1-21. 
6. Title I11 of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 08 11,001-11,050 (Supp. V 1987)). 
7. Pub. L. No. 100-582,102 Stat. 2950 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. $8 6992-6992k (West 
Supp. 1989)). 
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2. EPA should ensure a state has developed and has authority to 
implement a reasonable enforcement strategy before authorizing a 
state to cany out the enforcement responsibility for a federal 
program. 
3. Once a state has been authorized to carry out a federal program, 
most enforcement cases should be handled by the state without 
EPA intervention. 
4. EPA should retain authority to bring enforcement actions in 
cases involving significant interstate pollution. 
5. States should be able to refer certain enforcement cases to EPA. 
6. Systems used to account for progress in enforcement should be 
based on state enforcement strategies and should be' designed to 
encourage innovation by states. 
7. EPA should maintain a credible threat to withdraw authority 
from states whose implementation of federal programs is consis- 
tently inadequate. 
To provide the background necessary for understanding the 
need for a set of principles upon which enforcement responsibili- 
ties are allocated, this Article will first examine the historical 
allocation of environmental enforcement responsibilities between 
the federal and state governments. It will then review the major 
federal environmental legislation to identify how enforcement roles 
are divided between the various governmental bodies and to ex- 
amine how federal enforcement policies under those laws effect 
state enforcement. Finally, a discussion of a series of new prob- 
lems facing environmental enforcement officials will precede a 
detailed review of the suggested principles for allocating enforce- 
ment responsibilities. 
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"Environmental law" is not an innovation of the last two 
decades, of course. As Professor Rodgers notes in his treatise on 
environmental law, "[plrivate nuisance law long has forbidden 
substantial and unreasonable intrusions upon the use and enjoy- 
ment of another's pr~perty."~ Private nuisance cases are reported 
as early as the sixteenth ~ e n t u r y . ~  
Governmental involvement with environmental problems 
traces its history to the associated principle of public nuisance. A 
public nuisance is one that affects an interest common to the 
general public, rather than an interest peculiar to one or several 
 individual^.^^ This public wrong is normally redressed by the gov- 
ernment." Public nuisance actions have been brought by state and 
local governments to deal with a wide variety of environmental 
problems. Examples of problems addressed using nuisance law 
include the escape of petroleum from a storage tank into the 
groundwater,12 the discharge of chemicals into a watercourse,13 
smoke and gas emissions from a charcoal kiln,14 the storage of 
hazardous explosive  material^,^^ odors from the operation of a 
rendering plant,I6 the maintenance of an open irrigation ditch," 
the improper operation of a chemical waste disposal site,18 and the 
discharge of mercury-contaminated waste into a waterway.lg 
States use other common law theories to address environ- 
mental problems, such as trespass, negligence, strict liability for 
abnormally dangerous activities, water law, and public trust doc- 
8. W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 101 (1977). 
9. Id. (citing Z. CHAFFEE & E. RE, CASES & MATERIALS ON EQUITY 795-96 (4th 
ed. 1958)). 
10. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 585 (1971). 
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C (1969); 1 W. RODGERS, ENVI- 
RONMENTAL LAW 8 2.2, at 34 (1986). 
12. Berger v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 60 Minn. 296, 62 N.W. 336 (1895). 
13. West Muncie Strawboard Co. v. Slack, 164 Ind. 21,72 N.E. 879 (1904). 
14. Richards v. City of Seattle, 62 Wash. 684, 114 P. 896 (1911). 
15. State v. Excelsior Powder Mfg. Co., 259 Mo. 254, 169 S.W. 267 (1914). 
16. State ex rel. Harris v. Drayer, 218 Iowa 446, 255 N.W. 532 (1934). 
17. City of Scottsbluff v. Winters Creek Canal Co., 155 Neb. 723, 53 N.W.2d 543 
(1952). 
18. Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 86 Ill. 2d. 1,426 N.E.2d 824 (1981). 
19. State v. Ventron Corp., 182 N.J. Super. 210, 440 A.2d 455 (App. Div. 1981), 
aff'd in pertinent part, rev'd in part, 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150 (1983). 
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trine.20 Environmental enforcement based on nuisance and other 
common law theories was, and still is, primarily the domain of 
states and l~ca l i t i es .~~  Finally, beginning in the late 19407s, states 
adopted a variety of statutes to help address environmental 
problems.22 
Although federal and state governments took some steps to 
deal with worsening environmental problems, by the late 1960's 
the nation's environment was visibly hemorrhaging. Dirty air, pol- 
luted streams and lakes, and tainted drinking water supplies were 
being identified in all parts of the country.23 State and local com- 
mon law regulation and enforcement, and the then limited statutory 
law available to states was not adequate to resolve such severe 
problems.24 
Several factors. contributed to the inadequacy of state pro- 
grams. The case-by-case approach, necessitated by nuisance and 
other common law actions, was simply too slow, too cumbersome, 
20. W. RODGERS, supra note 8, at 100. See also ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, 
STATE HAZARDOUS WASTE ENFORCEMENT S UDY 97 (1987) [hereinafter STATE HAZARD- 
OUS WASTE STUDY]. 
21. In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), the Supreme Court held that 
"[wlhen we deal with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal 
common law . . . ." Id. at 103. Only nine years later, the Supreme Court all but closed the 
door on the federal environmental common law. In Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 
(1981), the Supreme Court concluded that: 
Congress has not left the formulation of appropriate federal [water pollution] 
standards to the courts through application of often vague and indeterminate 
nuisance concepts and maxims of equity jurisprudence, but rather has occupied 
the field through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program 
supervised by an expert administrative agency. The 1972 Amendments to the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act were not merely another law "touching 
interstate waters" of the sort surveyed in Illinois v. Milwaukee, and found 
inadequate to supplant federal common law. Rather, the Amendments were 
viewed by Congress as a "total restructuring" and "complete rewriting" of the 
existing water pollution legislation considered in that case . . . . The establish- 
ment of such a self-consciously comprehensive program by Congress, which 
certainly did not exist when Illinois v. Milwaukee was decided, strongly sug- 
gests that there is no room for courts to attempt to improve on that program 
with federal common law. 
Id. at 317-19. Most of the federal laws enacted after 1970 have been similarly comprehensive 
in nature and thus are likely to have displaced federal common law. See 1 W. RODGERS, 
supra note 11, § 2.14, at 122. 
22. See, e.g., 1945 Minn. Laws 395, 8 11 (relating to water pollution); 1947 Cal. Stat. 
632, § 1 (establishing air pollution control districts); 1954 N.J. Laws 212, 5 1 (Air Pollution 
Control Act). 
23. See S. REP. NO. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1969). 
24. See 1 F. GRAD, supra note 1, § 1.03, at 1-20. 
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and too unpredictable to handle the rapidly expanding number of 
environmental problems.25 State statutory law controlling environ- 
mental pollution had not adequately developed in most states.26 
Further, state laws could not adequately handle interstate air or 
water pollution problems.27 Economic competition among the 
states also put pressure on states not to make their environmental 
laws significantly more stringent than those of other states.28 Fi- 
nally, while public interest in environmental protection was grow- 
ing, the public consensus needed to expand state enforcement 
resources had not yet emerged.29 
It was apparent by 1970 that the emergency measures neces- 
sary to control environmental pollution had to come from the 
federal government. The resulting flurry of environmental 
legislation30 greatly increased the federal regulatory role. Along 
with this expanded regulatory role came a growing federal role in 
environmental enforcement and enforcement policy. 
To understand the federal and state enforcement roles, it is 
helpful to review the genera1 structure of the state and federal 
roles, in federal environmental programs and to examine the allo- 
cation of enforcement responsibilities in each of the major federal 
environmental laws. 
25. See F. SKILLERN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
1 1.25, at 18-19 (1981); see also F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRON- 
MENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 56-58 (1984). 
26. See 1 F. GRAD, supra note 1, § 1.03, at 1-20. 
27. See id. 8 1.03, at 1-20 to -21. 
28. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3 
(1974). 
29. See, e.g., AMERICANS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, THE RISING TIDE: PUBLIC OPIN- 
ION, POLICY & POLITICS 5-4 to -5 (1989). 
30. Among the major federal environmental laws enacted beginning in 1970 were the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604,84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982)); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments 
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 UkS.C. $5 1251-1376 
(1982 & Supp. V 1987)); the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92- 
516, 86 Stat. 973 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982 & Supp. V 1987)); 
the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-523,88 Stat. 1660 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. $5 300f-300j (1982 & Supp. V 1987)); the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580,90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. $8 6901- 
6991i (1982 & Supp. V 1987)); the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. $8 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)); the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments 
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616,98 Stat. 3221 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-69913 
(1982 & Supp. V 1987)); the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, Title 111, 100 Stat. 1613, 1728 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,001- 
11,050 (Supp. V 1987)); and the Medical Waste Tracking Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100- 
582, 102 Stat. 2950 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A.,§§ 6992-6992k (West Supp. 1989)). 
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Most of the major federal environmental laws divide respon- 
sibilities for environmental programs between the states and the 
federal government. Typically, a federal law will allow states to 
assume responsibility for carrying out a regulatory program if a 
state demonstrates that it has adequate authority and resources to 
implement and enforce the law. Federal laws refer to approved 
state proflams in several ways, ranging from states with programs 
having "primary enforcement responsibility," or "primacy," to 
states with programs having "approval," or "authorization," of 
state plans by EPA with joint federal-state enforcement. Federal 
authorization of a state program is usually a prerequisite for re- 
ceiving federal funding to help support the program. 
EPA typically retains some enforcement authority, although 
limitations may be placed on this authority. EPA's retained en- 
forcement authority will be reviewed in detail in this Article. EPA 
also retains the ability to withdraw any authority delegated to a 
state if the state consistently fails to carry out its responsibilities. 
The delegation of responsibility to the states combined with 
some retained authority raises legal questions of when the state or 
federal government will be precluded from pursuing an action that 
has been resolved by the other governmental body.31 The overlap- 
ping authority has an even more important practical effect. EPA's 
independent authority to file enforcement actions has no doubt 
resulted in stronger enforcement actions in some cases enforced 
at the state level. It has also caused frequent conflicts with the 
states, especially when it is used in a case where a state has already 
initiated an enforcement action against a facility. 
This practice, known as "overfiling," is designed to protect 
against inadequate state enforcement actions.32 Overfiling, how- 
31. See infra notes 152-153 and accompanying text. 
32. See UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF EN- 
FORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE MONITORING, POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR STAT-PA EN- 
FORCEMENT AGREEMENTS 22-23 (1986). The overfiling policy states that EPA may take 
enforcement action if the content of a state enforcement action is "inappropriate." Id. at 
22. An inappropriate action is described as one where the "remedies are clearly inappro- 
priate to correct the violation, if compliance schedules are unacceptably extended, or if 
there is no appropriate penalty or sanction." Id. at 22-23. Finally, the policy provides that 
EPA generally will not consider taking direct enforcement action solely for the recovery 
of additional penalties unless a state penalty is determined to be "grossly deficient." Id. at 
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ever, can disrupt state enforcement programs in several ways. The 
most important consequence of overfiling is an increased reluct- 
ance of regulated entities to deal solely with state enforcement 
officials. After an overfiling, the regulated entities quite under- 
standably become concerned that, without involving EPA, they 
cannot be sure a compliance schedule or a penalty amount agreed 
to by a state is final. As a result, states may find it more difficult 
to reach-settlements in cases initiated subsequent to an overfiling, 
Overfiling cases also use a great deal of the limited govern- 
mental enforcement resources simply dealing with other govern- 
ment regulators. Finally, overfiling cases frequently cause signifi- 
cant problems in the working relationship between state and 
federal regulat,ors. 
IV. THE EXPANSION O F T H E  FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT ROLE 
A. Clean Air Act 
I 
The passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 197033 
initiated the rapid expansion of the federal enforcement role. The 
expanded federal role under the Clean Air Act was, however, 
relatively modest. Federal enforcement authority was limited to 
taking enforcement action in a state with an approved state imple- 
mentation plan ("SIP") if the state failed to initiate an action within 
thirty days after being notified of a violation.34 
Under the Clean Air Act, the central regulatory mechanism 
is the SIP.35 The SIP must provide for the "implementation, main- 
tenance and enforcement" of air quality standards in the state.36 
- - - -- - 
- -
23. While this policy appears on its face to circumscribe EPA's ability to second guess 
state enforcement actions, its effect is limited for at least three reasons. First, the policy 
still leaves EPA with substantial discretion to determine whether a state enforcement action 
is "inappropriate." Second, EPA has final authority to make the decision on inappropriate- 
ness. Third, the policy is only guidance to EPA regions and to states. 
33. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 55 7401- 
7642 (1982)). 
34. See id. 5 7413(a)(l). For mobile sources of air pollutants (e.g., automobiles) the 
federal role is more expansive than for stationary sources. Violations of mobile source 
requirements are enforceable only by the federal government. See id. $5 7523, 7524. 
35. See id. 5 7410(a)(l). See also W. RODGERS, supra note 8, at 230-38. 
36. 42 U.S.C. 5 7410(a)(l) (1982). 
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EPA must approve any SIP or revision to a SIP if it is adequate 
to meet federal  standard^.^' The SIP is specifically required to 
provide for enforcement of emission limits and other regulations 
relating to stationary sources of air pollution.38 
Direct federal enforcement of an approved SIP requirement 
is authorized only if a violation of the SIP continues more than 
thirty days after EPA has notified the violator and the state of the 
violation.39 This notice period allows a state to initiate an enforce- 
ment action against the violator before EPA becomes involved. 
While EPA must review any resulting compliance plan,4O raising 
the possibility of overfiling, the practical effect of the notice period 
is to provide more state control over enforcement actions. 
EPA can also take over all SIP enforcement in a state. Federal 
assumption of SIP enforcement is authorized only if EPA,finds 
that violations of the SIP are "so widespread that such violations 
appear to result from a failure of the State . . . to enforce the plan 
effe~tively."~~ 
Even though the new federal enforcement authority provided 
in the Clean Air Act was relatively narrow in comparison to later 
federal laws, it was a substantial expansion of previous federal 
a ~ t h o r i t y . ~ ~  The 1967 Air Quality Act43 had authorized federal 
enforcement only to abate an imminent and substantial endanger- 
ment to public health and only when state or local authorities had 
failed to act.44 The 1970 amendments shifted the focus of federal 
involvement from extraordinary circumstances to a more general 
role in regulatory enforcement. 
37. Id. S 7410(a)(2). 
38. Id. S 7410(a)(2)@). If a state fails to submit an implementation plan that meets 
the requirements of the Clean Air Act, if a state implementation plan or a portion of a plan 
is determined by EPA not to accord with the requirements of the Clean Air Act, or if a 
state fails to revise an implementation plan after being notified by EPA, EPA may propose 
an implementation plan or a portion of one for the state. Id. S 7410(c)(l). The federal 
implementation plan must be promulgated by the Administrator within six months after the 
date the state ~ l a n  or revision was to have been submitted unless the state has ado~ted 
and submitted plan or revision prior to the promulgation of the federal implementation 
plan. Id. 
39. Id. S 7413(a)(l). 
40. Id. S 7410(a)(3). 
41. Id. S 7413(a)(2). Thirty days advance notice of the proposed assumption of 
enforcement responsibility is required. Id. 
42. See Environmental Law Institute, Federal-State Partnerships Under Three EPA 
Programs: A Legislative History 11-14 (Mar. 1987) [hereinafter Federal-State Partnerships]. 
43. Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat, 485 (1967). 
44. Id. S 108(K). 
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B. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
The federal law regulating pesticides follows the advance no- 
tice -pattern used in the Clean Air Act to allocate enforcement 
authority. The - Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide 
("FIFRA") regulates the manufacture, distribution, sale, and 
use of pesticides. The law requires pesticides to be registered with 
EPA.46 Data on the safety of a pesticide must be submitted to 
EPA, if requested by the Adminstrator, to support the registra- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  EPA may decide not to register a pesticide, register it for 
general use, or register the pesticide only for restricted uses.48 The 
use of registered pesticides is controlled by requiring the certifi- 
cation of most applicators49 and the submission and review of 
pesticide labels.50 
State authority to regulate pesticides is limited under FI- 
FRA.51 However, FIFRA allows a state to assume "primary en- 
forcement responsibility for pesticide use violations" once EPA 
has determined that a state has adopted adequate pesticide use 
laws, has adopted and is implementing adequate procedures for 
enforcing the laws, and will keep adequate compliance records.52 
States may also enter into cooperative agreements with EPA to 
enforce pesticide use  restriction^.^^ In this case, the state essen- 
tially is acting as an agent for EPA in enforcing federal law. 
EPA may initiate an enforcement action in a state with pri- 
mary enforcement responsibility only after providing the state with 
thirty days advance notice and after determining that the state has 
not commenced an appropriate enforcement action.54 The FIFRA 
standard appears to allow a somewhat greater federal role than 
the Clean Air Act since EPA is authorized to bring an enforcement 
action, after providing thirty days notice, if it determines that a 
45. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
46. Id. § 136a(a). 
47. Id. 8 136a(c). 
48. Id. § 136a(d). 
49. Id. 8 136i. 
50. Id. § 163a(c)(l)(C). 
51. For example, states may not impose labeling or packaging requirements in ad- 
dition to or different from those required by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Ro- 
denticide Act. See id. 8 136v(b). 
52. Id. § 136w-l(a). 
53. Id. 8 136~-l(b). 
54. Id. § 136w-2(a). 
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state enforcement action was not "appropriate." Under the Clean 
Air Act, EPA is only authorized to commence an enforcement 
action if the violation in question continues after the thirty-day 
notice period has expired. 
Under FIFRA, state primacy can be rescinded if EPA deter- 
mines that the state is not carrying out its responsibilities, provides 
the state ninety days to correct the deficiencies, and determines 
that the state program remains i n a d e q ~ a t e . ~ ~  The FIFRA enforce- 
ment scheme, like the scheme under the Clean Air- Act, evidences 
a strong preference for state enforcement even though the federal 
government may take an enforcement action under limited 
circumstances. 
C. Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act 
Although the Clean Air Act and FIFRA expanded the federal 
enforcement role, states still controlled most enforcement cases 
because of the mandatory advance notice requirements. The man- 
datory advance notice requirement was not included in the Federal 
Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act of 1972 ("Clean Water 
The result was a significant expansion of the federal en- 
forcement role. 
The principal regulatory mechanism in the Clean Water Act 
is the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
("NPDES") permit.57 Almost all facilities that discharge pollutants 
into a watercourse must hold an NPDES permit.58 Each NPDES 
permit contains a series of discharge limits designed to reflect the 
best currently available control t e~hnology ,~~  to protect the quality 
of receiving waters,60 and to limit the release of toxic po l l~ tan t s .~~  
The authority to issue NPDES permits may be delegated to a 
state62 if the state demonstrates, among other things, that it has 
adequate authority "[tlo abate violations of the permit or the permit 
55. Id. § 136~-2(b). 
56. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
57. Id. § 1342. 
58. Exceptions to the requirements of holding an NPDES permit are set out in 40 
C.F.R. 5 122.3 (1988). - 
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(l)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
60. Id. § 1313(a)(l). 
61. zd. 8 1317(aj(2). 
62. Id. § 1342(b). 
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program, including civil and criminal penalties and other ways and 
means of enf~rcement ."~~ 
EPA retains enforcement authority under the Clean Water Act 
even if the NPDES permitting process has been delegated to a 
state.64 Unlike the Clean Air Act and FIFRA, the Clean Water 
Act allows EPA to initiate an enforcement action against a facility 
in a delegated state without advance notif icat i~n.~~ EPA may pro- 
vide thirty-day advance notice of an enforcement action to the 
state, but it is not required to do so.66 
While the Clean Water Act made only a simple change in the 
federal-state enforcement relationship in not including the advance 
notice requirement, the result was a substantially heightened fed- 
eral impact on state enforcement. Instead of being required to give 
states an opportunity to take action to ensure that a violation is 
corrected, EPA can initiate its own enforcement case immediately. 
D. Safe Drinking Water Act 
The federal law regulating public drinking water supplies fur- 
ther expanded federal enforcement authority by authorizing direct 
federal involvement in enforcement actions where an imminent 
hazard has been identified. The Safe Drinking Water Act6' regu- 
lates the quality of public drinking water systems and the under- 
ground injection of contaminants. The drinking water system por- 
tion of the law requires the establishment of drinking water 
regulations identifying the maximum acceptable contaminant level 
63. Id. 1 1342(b)(7). 
64. Id. 8 1319(a). 
65. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act authorizes federal reassumption of all 
enforcement responsibilities where the Administrator finds widespread violations of permit 
conditions or limitations. Id. 8 1319(a)(2). At least 30 days advance notice to the state is 
required in this case. Id. 
66. The statute provides: 
Whenever . . . the Administrator finds that any person is in violation of any 
condition or limitation which implements section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 
1328, or 1345 of this title in a permit issued by a state under an approved 
permit program . . . he shall proceed under his [order or civil penalty] authority 
. . . or he shall notify the person in alleged violation and such state of such 
finding. 
33 U.S.C. 8 1319(a)(l) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (emphasis added). 
67. 42 U.S.C. $0 300f-300j (1982 and Supp. V 1987). 
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of various chemicals for a public drinking water supply.68 The 
underground injection provisions of the law only permit authori- 
zation, by permit or rule, of injections which will not endanger 
drinking water sources.69 
States are authorized to assume primary enforcement respon- 
sibility for the drinking water supply program if the state has, 
among other things, adopted drinking water regulations which are 
no less stringent than the federal regulations, and has adopted and 
is implementing adequate procedures for the enforcement of the 
state reg~lat ions .~~ For the underground injection program, EPA 
is required to publish a list of states in which EPA believes an 
underground injection program is ne~es sa ry .~~  To obtain primary 
enforcement authority a listed state must demonstrate that it has 
adopted an underground injection control program that meets the 
requirements of regulations issued by EPA.72 
Unlike the Clean Water Act, federal enforcement in a state 
with primacy for the drinking water system program ordinarily is 
authorized only if EPA has notified the state and the public water 
system, and provided "such advice and technical assistance to 
such State and public water system as may be appropriate to bring 
the system into compliance with such regulation or requirement 
by the earliest feasible time."73 If the violation continues beyond 
sixty days, EPA may initiate an enforcement action.74 Similarly, 
the underground injection portion of the law ordinarily requires 
EPA to provide thirty days notice to the state and an opportunity 
for the state to take appropriate enforcement action before EPA 
may commence an action.75 
However, in contrast to earlier statutes, the EPA Administra- 
tor is authorized to initiate an enforcement action under both the 
drinking water and underground injection programs in a state with 
primacy whenever EPA determines that the presence of a contam- 
inant presents an "imminent and substantial endangerment" to the 
public health, and that state and local authorities have not acted 
68. Id. 8 300g-l(B). 
69. Id. 8 300h(b)(l). 
70. Id. 0 3OOg-2(a). 
71. Id. § 300h-l(a). 
72. Id. 8 3OOh-l(b)(l)(A). 
73. Id. 13OOg-3(a)(l)(A). 
74. Id. § 3OOg-3(a)(l)(B). 
75. Id. 8 300h-2(a)(l). 
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to protect the public health.76 The Administrator is required to 
consult with the state and local authorities only "[tlo the extent 
he determines it to be practicable in light of such imminent 
endangerment. "77 
The Safe Drinking Water Act endangerment enforcement au- 
thority, more so than federal enforcement authority in early stat- 
utes, permits a quite independent federal enforcement role. Even 
though the Clean Water Act permits the federal government to 
proceed without notifying the state, the statutory language at least 
provides an optional procedure for allowing the state to act before 
EPA proceeds with an enforcement case.78 The endangerment pro- 
vision of the Safe Drinking Water Act conceivably permits a fed- 
eral enforcement action to be initiated in a state without prior 
notice to the state. 
E. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
The degree of federal involvement in environmental enforce- 
ment increased significantly with the development of the hazardous 
waste regulatory program under the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA").79 Under the RCRA program, the 
federal government has the authority not only to bring a direct 
federal enforcement action in a state, but also to control, through 
federal enforcement policy, the design of state enforcement 
programs. 
The RCRA hazardous waste program is based on an extremely 
detailed set of federal rules that regulate the generation, storage, 
transportation, treatment, and disposal of hazardous waste.80 
These "cradle to grave" regulations require that all "suspect" 
wastes be tested to determine if they are haza rdou~ ,~~  mandate 
hazardous waste be transported in appropriate containers that are 
clearly labeled as containing hazardous waste,s2 provide for proper 
storage  condition^,^^ require that a manifest accompany each ship- 
76. Id. § 300i. 
77. Id. 
78. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(l) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
79. 42 U.S.C. $8 6901-6991i (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
80. See 40 C.F.R. $0 260-265 (1988). 
81. Id. § 261.10. 
82. Id. §§ 262.3C.31. 
83. Id. § 262.34. 
Heinonline - -  14 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 20 1990 
19901 Federal-State Enforcement Roles 2 1 
ment of hazardous waste by a generator,84 and establish design 
and operating standards for treatment, storage, and disposal 
fac i l i t ie~.~~ 
In order to assume responsibility for the RCRA program, 
states are required to adopt rules that are "equivalent" to the 
federal  regulation^.^^ However, even in authorized states, EPA 
retains extensive enforcement authority under RCRA.87 EPA may 
(1) assess civil penalties through an administrative order, (2) issue 
compliance orders, (3) revoke or suspend permits, (4) commence 
civil judicial enforcement actions, or (5) initiate criminal investi- 
g a t i o n ~ . ~ ~  RCRA also allows EPA to exercise authority similar to 
its authority under the Safe Drinking Water Act when the Admin- 
istrator determines that an imminent hazard exists.89 
Except in the case of an imminent hazard, notice must be 
provided to a state with an authorized program at the time EPA 
initiates an enforcement action.g0 However, the advance notice 
provisions in prior federal laws that allow a state time to resolve 
the matter are not required under RCRA.91 This structure raises 
the same types of overfiling concerns present under the Safe Drink- 
ing Water Act. However, the more important issue under RCRA 
is the effect that EPA's RCRA "Enforcement Response Policy"g2 
has had on the structure of state enforcement programs. 
The Enforcement Response Policy is guidance by 
EPA to its regional offices and to states on what EPA considers 
to be "timely and appropriate" enforcement responses to violations 
of the RCRA  regulation^.^^ As guidance, the Enforcement Re- 
sponse Policy is not binding on states. However, the policy is 
important because compliance with it is one of the most significant 
criteria for evaluating the performance of state programs. Federal 
funding for state programs is, in turn, dependent upon the perfor- 
mance evaluation. 
84. Id. § 262.20. 
85. Id. S 264. 
86. 42 U.S.C. § 6926f.b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
87. See id. § 6928. See also Federal-State Partnershim, suDra note 42, at 32. 
- .  
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
89. Id. § 6973(a). 
90. Id. 88 6928(a)(2), 6973(a). 
91. Id. § 6973(c). 
92. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID 
WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, NFORCEMENT RESPONSE POLICY (1987) [hereinafter 
ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE POLICY]. 
93. Id. at 3, 4, 12-15. 
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Target numbers of inspections and estimates of the number 
of enforcement actions that a state is expected to meet during a 
fiscal year are based on an assumption that compliance will be 
achieved by the initiation of numerous administrative and judicial 
enforcement actions.94 By focussing on a limited range of enforce- 
ment alternatives and by mandating rapid response to violations, 
the policy inhibits states from using enforcement techniques that 
may, be more effective than those that EPA would utilize.9s 
In addition, EPA's enforcement policies focus on investiga- 
tions of treatment, storage, and disposal facilities and large gen- 
erators ;rather than on small-quantity hazardous waste genera- 
t o r ~ . ~ ~  In states such as Minnesota, there are few treatment, 
storage, or disposal facilities and relatively few large generators. 
There. are, however, a very large number of small-quantity gen- 
erators. Thus, one of the most significant enforcement concerns is 
small-quantity generator ~ompl iance .~~  The Enforcement Re- 
sponse Policy, however, constrains states from directing their lim- 
ited enforcement resources to these generators. 
94. STATE HAZARDOUS WASTE STUDY, supra note 20, at 88. 
95. According to one study: 
By encouraging compliance orders and civil penalty actions rather than shut- 
down orders, permit "bars," suspensions or revocations, bond forfeitures, and 
personal civil and criminal liability, EPA actually encourages affirmative ac- 
tions in which the agency canies the burden of proof and the burden of going 
forward and tolerates delay and litigation on the public's time, with the con- 
sequent devotion of limited technical and legal resources to virtually all cases 
rather than a concentration of resources on a few, targeted individuals or 
entities. By limiting the time for initiating action on a "RCRA violation," the 
state may be precluded (or at least discouraged) from addressing the major 
problem at a site with the most powerful and relevant legal tools, strategies 
and resources, and is encouraged to initiate a minor, relatively ineffective and 
limited, enforcement action for no reason other than to satisfy EPA timeframes 
and policies. 
~. 
Id. at 99-100. 
96. A person who generates between 100 and 1000 kilograms of hazardous waste in 
any month. Interview with Gordon Wegwart, assistant director, Hazardous Waste Division, 
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (Sept. 11, 1989). See also 40 C.F.R. 1 262.44 (1988). 
97. -Improper disposal of hazardous waste by small-quantity generators can produce 
serious environmental problems. For example, disposal of under 100 gallons of the dry- 
cleaning solvent perchloroethylene by a small-town dry-cleaning operation in Minnesota 
resulted in groundwater contamination that required the closing of a city well and dozens 
of private wells. The remedial costs have exceeded $1 million. Interview with Gary Pulford, 
chief, Site Response Section, Ground Water and Solid Waste Division, Minnesota Pollution 
Control Agency (Sept. 5, 1989). 
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F. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act 
With the passage of the Comprehensive Environmental Re- 
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA" or "Super- 
fund"),gs the federal role in enforcement reached its zenith. CER- 
CLA, in contrast to the other laws discussed in this Article, is not 
a regulatory program. Instead, it is desigried to accomplish the 
cleanup of hazardous waste disposal sites by establishing liability 
standards for persons responsible for disposal activitiesg9 and cre- 
ating a federal fund to be used when responsible parties do not 
conduct the cleanups.loO The principal regulation under CERCLA, 
the National Contingency Pl?n,lo1 simply provides directions on 
carrying out cleanup actions.lo2 
There are thousands of old hazardous waste disposal facilities 
in the country, representing varying degrees of risk to public health 
and the environment.103 Congress directed EPA to prioritize sites 
in accordance with their risk. As a result, the Superfund program 
established by CERCLA focusses on sites listed on the National 
Priorities List.lo4 The National Priorities List consists of those sites 
scoring above a threshold value on EPAYs hazard ranking sys- 
tem.los Over 1100 sites, assumed to be the worst in the country, 
are currently listed on the National Priorities List.Io6 
A major goal of CERCLA is to encourage persons responsible 
for the release of a hazardous substance to undertake the necessary 
cleanup activities.Io7 Therefore, the Superfund program essentially 
98. 42 U.S.C. 58 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
99. Id. § 9607. 
100. See id.; 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (Supp. V 1987) (originally enacted as CERCLA, Pub. 
L. No. 96-510, 8 221, 94 Stat. 2767, 2801 (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982))); 
CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 3 232, 94 Stat. 2767, 2804 (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. 
5 9641 (1982)) repealed by Superfund Amemndments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. 
L. N0.99-499, § 514, 100 Stat. 1613, 1767. 
101. 42 U.S.C. 8 9605 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
102. See 40 C.F.R. 8 300 (1988). 
103. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND 
PROGRAMS: 50-STATE STUDY at 111-3 to -5 (Aug. 18, 1989). 
104. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
105. See 40 C.F.R. § 300, apps. A, B (1988). 
106. CLEAN SITES, MAKING THE SUPERFUND WORK: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IM- 
PROVE PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION 1 (Jan. 1989). 
107. See 42 U.S.C. $8 9606(b)(1), 9622 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); Committee on Ap- 
propriations, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., United States House of Representatives, Status of 
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was designed to be an enforcement program,Io8 but little of this 
enforcement responsibility was provided to the states. CERCLA 
did not authorize any form of delegation to the states. The ability 
to issue cleanup orders was lodged solely with EPA.lo9 The only 
"enforcement" authority given a state was an ability to recover in 
federal court the costs a state had incurred in connection with a 
cleanup."O States only gradually assumed any role in the Super- 
fund process, primarily acting as agents of EPA in overseeing 
projects paid for with federal funds."' While a few states have 
initiated enforcement actions against responsible parties at Na- 
tional Priorities List sites, EPA has maintained its prerogative to 
seek additional relief against the responsible parties. 
EPA practice under the Superfund program has emphasized 
the use of Superfund dollars to clean up hazardous waste sites, 
rather than an aggressive effort to seek cleanup commitments from 
responsible parties.H2 The result has been that EPA's Superfund 
enforcement program has been underf~nded."~ Not surprisingly, 
the Environmental Protection Agency's Superfund Program 2 (Mar. 1988) (unreleased) 
[hereinafter Superfund Program Status] (on file with HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.). 
108. A 1985 report issued by the United States House of Representatives noted that: 
The current reauthorization, coming when it does, forces Congress to 
face a very fundamental policy question: how to ensure in the future that there 
are adequate resources, and to see that past, thoroughly repudiated, misman- 
agement problems are behind us. 
H.R. 2817 has been written with the underlying belief that Congress 
should focus on ways to ensure rapid and thorough cleanup of abandoned 
hazardous wastes rather than on past mistakes. It is clear from the accumulating 
data on waste sites that EPA will never have adequate monies or manpower 
to address the problem itself. As a result, an underlying principle of H.R. 2817 
is that Congress must facilitate cleanups of hazardous substances by the re- 
sponsible parties while assuring a strong EPA oversight role with a set of tough 
legal enforcement standards. 
H.R. REP. NO. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 55 (1985). 
109. See 42 U.S.C. 8 9606 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
1 10. See id. 8 9607(a)(4)(A). 
111. The 1986 amendments to CERCLA require that states be provided with a 
"substantial and meaningful" role in designating National Priority List sites, developing 
cleanup plans, and settling with responsible parties. Superfund Amendments and Reau- 
thorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 8 121(f), 100 Stat. 1613, 1676 (1986) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 8 9621(f) (Supp. V 1987)). The draft revisions of the 
National Contingency Plan required by SARA permit states to assume the lead role in 
overseeing work at National Priority List sites. 53 Fed. Reg. 51,393,51,454-56 (1988). Still, 
states are not delegated the authority to run the CERCLAISARA enforcement program in 
the manner states are authorized to mangge other federal environmental programs. 
112. See CLEAN SITES, supra note 106, at 7-8. 
113. Id. at 7. 
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financial and other resources available from EPA to the states to 
pursue enforcement actions have been correspondingly limited.n4 
The combined effect of the failure of CERCLA to delegate 
enforcement responsibilities to the states, the inability of states to 
settle conclusively National Priorities List cases with responsible 
parties, EPA's emphasis on cleanups financed with dollars from 
the Superfund, and the limited enforcement resources available to 
EPA and the states has resulted in a low level of enforcement 
activity under CERCLA.H5 In addition, because of EPA's lack of 
emphasis on enforcement, states that have had successful hazard- 
ous waste cleanup enforcement programs have administered the 
programs essentially independent of the federal program.l16 
V. REVERSING THE TREND 
Beginning in the mid-1980's, the trend toward federalizing 
environmental enforcement and enforcement policymaking began 
to change. The three newest federal environmental programs all 
provide for a much stronger state enforcement role. Unfortunately, 
no clear pattern for allocating enforcement responsibilities can be 
gleaned from these new statutes. Rather, this change appears to 
have been produced by federal budgetary limitations and by the 
administrative difficulty created by the large number of facilities 
regulated by these laws. 
114. Only $5 million was available to support state enforcement actions nationwide 
in each of federal fiscal years 1988 and 1989. Interview with Gary Pulford, chief, Site 
Response Section, Ground Water and Solid Waste Division, Minnesota Pollution Control 
Agency (Oct. 30, 1989). 
115. See SENATE SUBCOMM. ON SUPERFUND, OCEAN AND WATER PROTECTION, 
1 0 1 s ~  CONG., IST SESS., LAUTENBERG-DURENBERGER REPORT ON SUPERFUND: CLEANING 
UP THE NATION'S CLEANUP ROGRAM 118-27 (1989). 
116. In Minnesota, for example, the state adopted its own superfund legislation in 
1983. Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability Act, MINN. STAT. $ 115B (1988). 
In November of 1988, 139 sites were listed on the state's "Permanent List of Priorities," 
40 of which were on the National Priority List. MINNESOTA POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, 
REPORT ON THE USE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION A D COMPLI- 
ANCE FUND URING FISCAL YEAR 1988 4-5 (1988) (report on use of the state fund) (on file 
with HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.). Response actions had been taken at 104 of the sites with 73 
of the response actions conducted by responsible parties. Id. at 5. Response actions had 
been completed at 38 sites by November of 1988. Id. at 6. Both the percentage of responsible 
party funded response actions and the percentage of completed actions substantially ex- 
ceeded the record of the federal Superfund program. See Superfund Program Status, supra 
note 107, at ii; CLEAN SITES, supra note 106, a t  1-2.. 
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A. Underground Storage Tanks 
The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 to the 
Solid Waste Disposal Act established a new program to regulate 
underground storage tanks ("UST").H7 EPA's enforcement strat- 
egy for the program strongly supports the need for innovative state 
enforcement, beginning the reversal of the trend toward increased 
federalization of environmental enforcement."* 
The UST program is designed to address two problems. First, 
similar to the Superfund law, the UST program requires owners 
of underground tanks to take corrective action with respect to the 
release of petroleum from storage tanks.lIg Second, the Act man- 
dates the development of regulations establishing new tank per- 
formance standards120 and requirements for leak detection, record 
keeping, and closure of tanks.I2l The responsibility for managing 
the federal UST program may be delegated to a state if the state 
standards are at least as stringent as the federal standards and the 
state has adequate enforcement a~ th0r i ty . I~~  
The UST program combines some of the regulatory aspects 
of RCRA with cleanup requirements similar to CERCLA. How- 
ever, in marked contrast to CERCLA, the UST program relies 
heavily on state enforcement. The enforcement strategy for the 
program notes that "[sltates will be expected to conduct the ma- 
jority of enforcement actions" for the ~ r 0 g r a m . I ~ ~  Further, unlike 
the RCRA enforcement strategy, the UST strategy provides that 
EPA will approve a variety of state programs and will "encourage 
States to use innovative approaches in all program areas."124 
States may also administer the UST program without adopting 
state rules. In an expansion of the cooperative agreement enforce- 
ment approach originated under FIFRA,125 the UST law permits a 
117. Pub. L. No. 98-616, Title VI, 98 Stat. 3221,3277-88 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. 9 6991-69913 (S~pp.  V 1987)). 
118. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID 
WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, FY 1989-FY 1990 COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 
STRATEGY FOR THE UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANK PROGRAM 3-5 (Jan. 5, 1989) [herein- 
after UST COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT S RATEGY]. 
119. 42 U.S.C. 9 6991b(h) (Supp. V 1987). 
120. Id. 8 6991b(e). 
121. Id. 9 6991b(c). 
122. Id. 9 6991c(a). 
123. UST COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT S RATEGY, supra note 118, at 3. 
124. Id. at 5. 
125. See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text. 
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state to exercise most of the enforcement authorities provided to 
the EPA Administrator where (1) the Administrator determines a 
state has the capabilities to carry out effective corrective actions 
and enforcement activities, and (2) the Administrator has entered 
into a cooperative agreement with the state.I26 
EPA does retain the authority to issue compliance orders for 
violations that occur in a state with a delegated UST progiam.12' 
Notice to the states is required.128 This provision does not cover 
violations in a state where the state is exercising enforcement 
authority pursuant to a cooperative agreement. Since the .state 
essentially is acting as an agent of the federal government in this 
case, EPA is probably precluded from taking enforcement action 
where the state has already acted.129 
B. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
The state role in enforcement of a federal program was sig- 
nificantly expanded by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthor- 
ization Act of 1986 ("SARA").130 Title III of SARA, the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act ("Emergency Plan- 
ning Act"),I3l for the first time gave states extensive direct au- 
thority to enforce a federal environmental law in federal 
Title I11 was introduced in response to the disaster in Bhopal, 
India.133 The Act was designed to upgrade planning for chemical 
emergencies,134 as well as to provide persons in communities where 
hazardous substances are stored with information about which 
126. 42 U.S.C. 3 6991b(h)(7)(A) (Supp. V 1987). 
127. Id. S 6991e(a)(2). 
128. Id. 
129. See STATE HAZARDOUS WASTE STUDY, supra note 20, at 5. 
130. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
38 9601-9675, 11,001-11,050 (SUPP. V 1987)). 
131. 42 U.S.C. 33 11,001-11,050 (Supp. V 1987). 
132. States have been authorized to initiate citizen suits under several of the principal 
environmental statutes. Citizen suit provisions, however, frequently contain restrictions on 
their use, such as advance notice requirements. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 3 1365(b) 
(1982 & Supp. V 1987); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 3 300j-8(b) (1982 & Supp. V 
1987); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 3 6972(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); and Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 
3 7604@) (1982). Direct access to federal court is provided to states under section 107 of 
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 3 9607 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). However, this section only enables 
states to recover costs they have incurred in cleaning up hazardous waste sites. 
133. See H.R. REP. NO. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 258 (1985). 
134. See 42 U.S.C. 3 11,003 (Supp. V 1987). 
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facilities utilize the hazardous materials.135 The vehicle for accom- 
plishing these purposes is a series of reporting requirements. The 
Emergency Planning Act mandates submission of a variety of 
reports and documents concerning the presence, release, and in- 
ventory of hazardous materials136 to State Emergency Response 
 commission^,'^^ Local Emergency Planning Com~ni t tees ,~~~ and 
local fire departments. The Act also requires manufacturing facil- 
ities to quantify routine releases of toxic chemicals and to report 
the releases to the state and to EPA.139 
Unlike early environmental programs, the Emergency Plan- 
ning Act extends direct federal enforcement authority to state and 
local governments.140 Since the Act mandates reporting require- 
ments to state and local entities created by federal law and pro- 
vides for direct enforcement by state and local governments, del- 
egation authority was not included in the law. While the EPA and 
state enforcement jurisdiction are not coextensive, the state au- 
thority extends to most of the key reporting requirements of the 
Act.141 From the perspective of practical enforcement, it is signif- 
icant that Congress has provided little funding to EPA to enforce 
the Emergency Planning Act. As a result, EPA's enforcement 
strategy for the Act relies heavily on state enf0r~ement. l~~ 
135. See id. § 11,022(e). 
136. See id. $0 11,002, 11,004, 11021, 11022. 
137. See id. § 11,00I(a). 
138. See id. 5 11,00l(c). 
139. Id. § 11,023. 
140. Id. 8 11,046(a)(2). 
141. States are not granted enforcement authority for violations related to reporting 
releases of extremely hazardous substances under section 11,004 of the Emergency Planning 
Act and related to reporting the routine release of toxic chemicals under section 11,023 of 
the Act. Compare 42 U.S.C. 1 11,045 (Supp. V 1987) with 42 U.S.C. § 11,046 (Supp. V 
1987). 
142. EPA's Title I11 enforcement strategy provides that: 
With the notable exception of section 313 Toxic Release Inventory require- 
ments and section 322 Trade Secret submissions, Title 111 [the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act] was intended to be implemented 
mainly as a state and local program. Consistent with Congressional intent, EPA 
plans a two tiered approach for enforcement. First, EPA will place major 
emphasis on enforcing those sections of Title I11 where it has primary govern- 
mental enforcement authority, namely sections 304 [spill reporting], 313 [toxic 
release inventory], and 322 [trade secrets] . . . . 
Second, EPA will take enforcement action on a limited number of specific 
cases referred by the State Emergency Response Commissions ("SERCs") for 
violation of sections 302, 303, 311 and 312 . . . . However, EPA believes that 
states have the primary responsibility for enforcement of sections 302,303,311 
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C.  Medical Waste Tracking Act 
The direct statutory authorization of state enforcement pro- 
grams was further expanded by recent legislation dealing with 
medical waste. The Medical Waste Tracking Act of 1988143 pro- 
vides participating states with the same enforcement authority as 
the federal government. The Act establishes a demonstration med- 
ical waste tracking program for the states of New York, New 
Jersey, and C0nne~ticut . l~~ In addition, all of the Great Lakes 
states are included in the demonstration program unless the gov- 
ernor of a state decides to withdraw from the ~ r 0 g r a m . l ~ ~  The 
demonstration program in participating states will require specific 
types of medical waste146 to be separated from other waste, to be 
placed in specially labeled contajners, and to be accompanied by 
a manifest147 if the waste is shipped o f f - ~ i t e . ~ ~ ~  
The Medical Waste Tracking Act moves a step beyond the 
Emergency Planning Act by providing coextensive enforcement 
authority to the states and the federal government. The Act pro- 
vides that a state may conduct inspections and take enforcement 
actions against any person to the same extent as the EPA Admin- 
and 312. State and Iocal governments are the recipients of the data submissions 
for most of the requirements and are in the best position to identify violators. 
SERCs and Local Emergency Planning Committees ("LEPCs") have the sta- 
tutory authority to enforce sections 302,303,311 and 312 through civil actions. 
Regional enforcement personnel should contact SERCs.in their regions to set 
up counterparts for enforcement referrals and information exchange. This ap- 
proach acknowledges that successful implementation of Title I11 requires states 
to have an active role in enforcement. 
United States ~nvironmental Protection Agency, Draft Enforcement Strategy for CERCLA 
1 103 and Title I11 Provisions 1-2 (Apr. 8, 1988) (emphasis added) [hereinafter CERCLA 
Enforcement Strategy] (on file with HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.). 
143. Pub. L. No. 100-582, 102 Stat. 2950 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. 
$3 6992-6992K (West Supp. 1989)). 
144. Id. 5 6992(a). 
145. Id. All the Great Lakes states decided to withdraw from the program, except 
New York, which was required to participate. Louisiana, Rhode Island, and the District 
of Columbia initially petitioned for acceptance into the demonstration program. However, 
Louisiana and the District of Columbia ultimately decided not to participate. See 54 Fed. 
Reg. 35,189 (1989). 
146. Regulated medical wastes include cultures and stocks of infectious agents, 
human pathological wastes, human blood and blood products, animal wastes, isolation 
ward wastes, and sharps. 54 Fed. Reg. 12,373 (1989). 
147. A manifest is a shipping document that contains information on the shipper of 
the waste, the nature of the waste to be shipped, the transporter, and the facility to which 
the waste is to be shipped. 
148. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6992b(a) (West Supp. 1989). 
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i~ t ra t0r . l~~ In an interesting reversal of the practice under earlier 
federal laws, the Act requires states to notify EPA when initiating 
an enforcement action under the Act. lSO 
Under the Medical Waste Tracking Act, just as under the 
Emergency Planning Act, Congress provided very limited funding 
to EPA for enforcement. As a result, EPA's enforcement strategy 
again relies heavily on state enforcement.151 
The structure of the Medical Waste Tracking Act has raised 
a number of potential difficulties in the federal-state enforcement 
relationship. The EPA enforcement strategy for the Act points out 
that, in signing the law, then-President Reagan noted that 
I have also been advised that Section 11007 of the bill, which 
authorizes states "to take enforcement action against any per- 
son to the same extent as the Administrator" may raise serious 
constitutional problems. To the extent that Congress provided 
for States to prosecute crimes or exercise other executive 
branch authority, it could be inconsistent with the Appoint- 
ments Clause of the Cons t i tu t i~n .~~~ 
Further, the EPA enforcement strategy asserts that a state enforce- 
ment action brought in federal court under the Medical Waste 
Tracking Act is not binding on EPA.lS3 This asserted non-binding 
effect of state enforcement actions creates a significant problem 
for state enforcement officials. Knowing the federal government 
believes it could pursue an independent action even if the state 
action is brought directly under federal law, the regulated party 
may be reluctant to settle an enforcement action with a state. 
Finally, the policy provides that all penalties collected by a state 
in such an action must be paid to the Federal Treasury.lS4 The fact 
149. Id. § 6992f(a). 
150. Id. 
151. The enforcement strategy for the Medical Waste Tracking Act provides that 
"[tlhe task of implementing the Medical Waste Tracking Program will lie primarily with the 
States. States will have the lead for conducting inspections related to, and enforcement of, 
the medical waste tracking program." United States Environmental Protection Agency, 
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Medical Waste Enforcement Strategy 8 
(1989) (on file with HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.). 
152. Id. 
153. Id. Similar concerns about whether a state enforcement action will preclude a 
subsequent federal enforcement action exist under most of the major environmental laws. 
However, no other federal law has provided as much direct enforcement authority to the 
states as the Medical Waste Tracking Act. Thus, the preclusion issue is heightened in cases 
brought under the Act. 
154. Id. 
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that any fines collected as a result of a state enforcement-action 
are to be paid to the Federal Treasury may be a substantial dis- 
incentive for a state to pursue an enforcement action directly under 
the authority of the Medical Waste Tracking Act. 
Given these limitations, the enforcement program for the Med- 
ical Waste Tracking Act as implemented through EPA's enforce- 
ment strategy will likely be very difficult to carry out in the absence 
of parallel state enforcement legislation. 
VI. THE NEED FOR A REASSESSMENT OF THE STATE AND 
FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT ROLES 
The preceding discussion depicts the varying approaches to 
the state and federal roles in environmental enforcement taken by 
Congress and EPA over the past two decades under the major 
federal environmental programs. In particular, it demonstrates a 
dramatic federalization of enforcement in the 1970's and early 
1980's and an apparent reversal of this trend in the last half of the 
1980's. 
No set of principles readily emerges from the analysis of these 
laws and the underlying federal enforcement policy to explain why 
enforcement responsibilities were allocated to the federal or state 
governments under each of the federal laws. Instead, the allocation 
of responsibility appears to be haphazard, responding to short- 
term problems rather than to any consistent theory ofdhe appro- 
priate long-term roles of various levels of government. 
This erratic pattern is perhaps the inevitable result of the 
massive new environmental programs constructed during the 
period. However, it is now clear that environmental enforcement 
will be a bilateral responsibility of the federal and state govern- 
ments over the long-term. Given this long-term enforcement rela- 
tionship, it is important that a carefully considered set of principles 
be utilized to allocate responsibilities between the federal and state 
governments. Only by clearly understanding their respective roles 
in enforcement can the states and the federal government establish 
the effective enforcement programs necessary to respond to the 
increased workload that has come with the expansion of environ- 
mental programs, given the limited resources available. 
Heinonline - -  14 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 31 1990 
32 Haward Environmental Law Review [Vol. 14:7 
Several factors make this a particularly important time to 
develop a set of principles upon which enforcement responsibilities 
can be consistently allocated. The first factor is the profound 
change in environmental enforcement in the past five years result- 
ing fiom the geometric expansion in the number of regulated 
entities. From 1970 to the early 1980's the principal focus of en- 
vironmental enforcement was on relatively few larger facilities, 
perhaps numbering in the tens of thousands nationally. Beginning 
with the expansion of the application of the RCRA regulations to 
small-quantity hazardous waste generators,lSs the number of reg- 
ulated entities grew rapidly. The scale of the enforcement problem 
is demonstrated by the number of regulated entities in Minne- 
sota.Is6 There are more than 15,000 small-quantity hazardous waste 
generators in the state.lS7 The underground storage tank program 
added another large universe of facilities to the enforcement 
agenda. In Minnesota, there, are more than 33,000 regulated un- 
derground storage tanks.Is8 Reporting requirements under the 
Emergency Planning Act further ballooned enforcement respon- 
sibilities. In Minnesota, the reporting requirements cover more 
than 10,000 facilities.Is9 The Medical Waste Tracking Act will in- 
troduce thousands of previously unregulated facilities into the en- 
vironmental .enforcement system in participating states. In Min- 
nesota, there are more than 6000 facilities that generate infectious 
medical waste,l60 a subset of the medical wastes regulated under 
155. Prior to September 22, 1986, most of the federal RCRA regulations only applied 
to persons who generated more than 1000 kilograms of hazardous waste a month. See 51 
Fed. Reg. 10,150-51 (1986). In the 1986 Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments to the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Congress required EPA to promulgate standards 
for persons who generate.between 100 and 1000 kilograms of hazardous waste in a month. 
See Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 221, 98 Stat. 3221, 3248 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 5 6921(d) (Supp. 
V 1987)). One hundred kilograms equals 220 pounds or the equivalent of about one-half of 
a 55-gallon drum. 
156. Minnesota is a medium-sized state with a population of slightly over 4,100,000. 
See STATE INFORMATION BOOK 1987-1988 at 379 (G. Jones ed. 1987). 
157. Interview with Gordon Wegwart, assistant director, Hazardous Waste Division, 
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (Sept. 11, 1989). 
158. Interview with Michael Kanner, chief, Tanks and Spills Section, Minnesota 
Pollution Control Agency (Sept. 17, 1989). 
159. Interview with Lee Tischler, director, Minnesota State Emergency Response 
Commission (Apr. 17, 1989). 
160. Infectious waste typically includes certain wastes from medical laboratories, 
blood and some othQ body fluids, hypodermic needles and syringes, and waste from 
research animals intentionally exposed to agents that are infectious to humans. See OFFICE 
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE O F  MINNESOTA, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
ON THE REGULATION OF INFECTIOUS WASTE 111-9 to -22 (Aug. 1988). Although Minnesota 
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the federal law.l61 In the next few years it is likely that groundwater 
protection programs will be adopted in many states.162 When en- 
acted, these groundwater programs will add thousands more reg- 
ulated entities to the enforcement responsibilities of officials in the 
states involved. 
It will be difficult for government to respond effectively to 
this vastly expanded workload. One consequence is that enforce- 
ment programs likely will be required to focus more on general 
deterrence163 of violations rather than on cases designed only to 
resolve specific violations. Federal enforcement policies also will 
have to provide states with incentives to utilize innovative ap- 
proaches rather than constrain states by imposing federal enforce- 
ment preferences on them. lri4 
withdrew from participation in the Medical Waste Tracking Act demonstration program, 
the state legislature adopted legislation regulating the management of infectious waste. See 
1989 Minn. Laws 337. 
161. Interview with Pauline Bouchard, division director, Division of Environmental 
Health; Minnesota Department of Health (Mar. 2, 1989). 
162. Arizona, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, among others, have already adopted 
comprehensive groundwater protection legislation. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S§  45-401 
to -636 (1987); IOWA CODE SS 455E.1--11 (1989); 1989 Minn. Laws 326; WIS. STAT. ANN. 
09 160.001-.SO (West 1989). 
163. In its analysis of hazardous waste enforcement under RCRA, the Environmental 
Law- Institute noted that: 
Because it is impossible ordinarily to achieve specific deterrence [in the RCRA 
program] (site-by-site detection and citation of every violation ever committed), 
credible enforcement programs must also rely on general deterrence (volutary 
compliance induced by awareness of the risk of detection and the net effect of 
the likely sanction as compared with the benefit of noncompliance). Credible 
general deterrence efforts generally require (1) public awareness of active 
enforcement personnel, (2) public awareness that there is a hidden enforcement 
presence (i.e., investigators), (3) credible sanctions timely imposed upon a 
cross-section of the regulated community, and (4) some number of severe 
sanctions that have been imposed. 
STATE HAZARDOUS WASTE STUDY, supra note 20, at 5-6. 
164. The enforcement strategy for the UST program recognizes the need for en- 
couraging the states to develop innovative approaches to enforcement. 
The State program approval objectives provide the States with the minimum 
Standards for EPA's approval, but at the same time do not dictate the methods 
States may use in meeting these standards. EPA believes this approach to State 
program approval will provide the States with significant flexibility, permit 
alternative methods of implementation, and still ensure that State UST pro- 
grams adequately protect the environment. EPA seeks to approve a variety of 
State programs and to encourage States to use innovative approaches in all 
program areas. 
UST COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT S RATEGY, supra note 118, at 4-5. See supra note 
95 and accompanying text. 
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The second factor pointing to the need to re-evaluate the 
federal-state enforcement roles is the failure of the heavily feder- 
alized RCRA and CERCLA programs to achieve high compliance 
rates. Under RCRA, compliance rates have been consistently low. 
A 1988 Government Accounting Office study found that even for 
landfills, EPA's highest enforcement priority, compliance rates 
were only about fifty percent.16s The study also found accurate 
compliance rates were not even available for hazardous waste 
treatment and storage fa~i1ities.l~~ 
The Superfund program has been heavily criticized for not 
achieving more rapid ~1eanups . I~~ Much of this criticism has fo- 
cussed on the failure of EPA to utilize the enforcement tools 
provided in both CERCLA and SARA.16* A 1988 report by the 
United States House of Representatives, Committee on Appropri- 
ations, found that "EPA's management philosophy and policies 
are generally predisposed to relying on Superfund assets to execute 
the program rather than requiring responsible party cleanups."lb9 
The result was that in 1989 five public dollars were being expended 
for Superfund work for every responsible party dollar.170 The five- 
public-to-one-private dollar ratio was in marked contrast to the 
165. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE: NEW APPROACH 
NEEDED TO MANAGE THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION A D RECOVERY ACT 43 (July 1988). 
. - 
166. Id. at 41. 
167. See penerallv Environmental Defense Fund. Hazardous Waste Treatment Coun- 
cil, Nat'l ~udubYon Sot.: Nat. Resources Defense council, Nat'l Wildlife Fed., Sierra Club, 
U.S. PIRG, Right Train, Wrong Track: Failed Leadership in the Superfund Cleanup Pro- 
gram 42-54 (June 20, 1988). 
168. SARA added several provisions designed specifically to encourage settlements, 
including providing responsible parties with non-binding allocations of the parties' shares 
of responsibility, the availability of partial government funding, and authority to enter into 
separate settlements with de minimis contributors. See 42 U.S.C. 8 9622 (Supp. V 1987). 
See also CLEAN SITES, supra note 106, at 11-13. 
169. Superfund Program Status, supra note 107, at ii. The report also observed that: 
It is EPA's responsibility, given the legal authorities provided in the Superfund 
legislation, to implement an enforcement grogram which will achieve timely, 
privately-funded cleanup actions or cost recovery settlements. Thisfrmdamen- 
tal responsibility was set forth in the original legislation and reinforced in 
SARA. Further, the SARA legislative history makes evident that the Congress 
recognized that without a highly s~cccessful enforcemen1 program, EPA ~vould 
never achieve the objectives of the Superfind legislation because EPA, by 
itself, could nor secure the financial and human resources required to solve 
the problem. 
Id. at 8. See also Mays, Superfund Enforcement in the Dumps: What's Wrong 1villr the 
Superfitnd Program?, NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., Feb. 1989, at 4. 
170. See Superfund Program Status, supra note 107, at 13. 
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experience reported under the enforcement-based Minnesota Su- 
perfund program, under which private funds have financed the 
vast majority of cleanup work.171 A more recent study by Clean 
Sites, an organization developed to help bring about settlements 
with responsible parties in Superfund cases, also concluded that 
the slow progress of the Superfund cleanup program was related 
to EPA's failure to use aggressively its enforcement a~ th0r i ty . l~~  
A third factor pointing toward the need to reassess the gov- 
ernmental enforcement roles is the increasing demand on EPA 
related to interstate and international problems. A number of in- 
terstate issues have become more important in the past few years. 
These issues include acid precipitation, interstate transport of 
ozone precursors, the interstate movement of air toxics, and the 
interstate transportation and disposal of solid and hazardous 
171. A United States House of Representatives report which examined the Minnesota 
program noted that: 
By December 1987, the State had categorized 20 of 130 (15 percent) sites as 
having the final remedy in place. In comparison, EPA, on a national basis, 
Izas completed work on only 13, or 1 percent, of the 951 NPL sites. 
Minnesota's Superfund philosophy on enforcement has clearly favored 
obtaining PRP's [potentially responsible parties] takeovers on hazardous sites. 
For example, PRP's are conducting about 80 percent of the RyFS's [remedial 
investigationlfeasibility studies] and about 90 percent of the RDIRA's [remedial 
desidremedial actions]. Further, through June 30, 1987, PRYs have financed 
about 90 percent of program costs, which total about $113 million. 
Id. at 23. 
172. The Clean Sites study noted that: 
When the Superfund law was firs: enacted, the government intended to 
use its broad enforcement authorities to require responsible parties to clean up 
a sizeable percentage of the sites on the [National Priority List] . . . . 
After the reauthorization of Superfund in 1986, when ample Superfund 
money subsequently became available to finance site work, EPA came to rely 
more extensively on Fund-financed actions. In those years, 1982-84, and 1987- 
88, when EPA reportedly had abundant money and few sites ready for expen- 
ditures, the Agency chose to spend most of the money on its own program of 
site investigation and cleanup, rather than undertake the more lengthy and 
expensive process of PRP identification, enforcement negotiations, and litiga- 
tion leading to privately financed cleanups or cost recovery actions. Given 
Clean Sites' understanding that there will be more sites ready to have work 
begin by the end of 1989 than there will be Fund money available, it is clear 
that the financing of additional cleanups will have to come from PRP settle- 
ments and EPA enforcement actions. 
EPA's 1986-88 pattern of using the Superfund monies as a first choice 
to finance response actions retarded the ultimate resolution of the site cleanup 
problem. 
CLEAN SITES, supra note 106, at 7. 
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waste. Internationally, global warming, exportation of hazardous 
waste, overseas disposal of solid waste, and acid precipitation 
problems are also drawing more of EPA's attention.173 These in- 
terstate and international issues are likely to require an increasing 
percentage of EPA's limited resources. Due to federal deficit prob- 
lems, these resources are unlikely to increase in proportion to the 
new demands on EPA.174 
Finally, in the twenty years since the federal government 
began assuming a heightened role in environmental enforcement, 
many state programs have been significantly strengthened. State 
budgets for environmental programs have increased substantially 
since 1982, even in the face of declining levels of federal grant 
assistance. 
VII. THE PRINCIPLES FOR ALLOCATING ENFORCEMENT 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Twenty years ago, one of the main reasons for an increased 
federal role in environmental protection was the inadequacy of 
state programs, including state enforcement. Today, allowing 
173. Indicative of the increased emphasis on international issues is the fact that the 
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency recently has proposed upgrading 
its Office of International Activities from Associate to Assistant Administrator status. See 
19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2542 (Mar. 3 1, 1989). 
174. See Congressional Budget Office, Environmental Federalism: Allocating Re- 
sponsibilities for Environmental Protection 1, 4 (Sept. 1988) (staff working paper) (on file 
with HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.). 
175. The following table shows the increased state funding role in three environmen- 
tal programs.' 
EPA Grants a s  a Percentage Total State Budgets 








1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
*Includes water quality programs; some drinking water programs may not be included, 
**Includes both hazardous and solid waste programs. 
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states and, in some cases, local governments, to reassume a greater 
enforcement role may be the only way to ensure an effective 
enforcement presence among the tens of thousands of regulated 
entities that now exist in each state. Strong, well-focussed enforce- 
ment efforts designed to address the varying.types of regulated 
entities in each state are necessary to obtain the high levels of 
voluntary compliance without which the vast regulatory programs 
will not succeed. 
The principles articulated below are designed to assign specific 
responsibilities to each level of government to avoid duplicative 
efforts, conserve limited resources, minimize disruptive intergov- 
ernmental conflicts, provide greater certainty and finality in en- 
forcement actions, and allow for flexibility and innovation to meet 
the heavy enforcement responsibilities of government regulators- 
in sum, to achieve more effective and efficient enforcement. Con- 
gress should apply these principles to allocate enforcement re- 
sponsibilities between the states and the federal government in 
enacting new environmental programs and reauthorizing existing 
programs. EPA should also utilize the principles to the extent 
permitted by Congress in developing enforcement policies. 
A. States Should Adopt Their Own Regulatory and Enforcement 
Authority to Support Federal Regulatory Programs 
Most of the environmental laws reviewed in this Article re- 
quire states to adopt parallel regulatory programs and to use ex- 
isting enforcement authority or to obtain new enforcement ,au- 
thority in order to be delegated enforcement primacy. The 
Emergency Planning Act and the Medical Waste Tracking Act, 
however, provide direct federal enforcement authority to the 
states. Even if states are authorized to use federal enforcement 
authority directly, states should enact parallel state enforcement 
authority. There are several reasons for this approach. 
First, the state enforcement authority allows access to the 
more numerous state courts. Second, state enforcement authority 
can be more closely tailored to the enforcement needs of each 
state. Third, the adoption of federal enforcement programs as state 
law helps develop legislative support for the program which, in 
turn, helps to make available the necessary resources to enforce 
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the-law adequately. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, inde- 
pendent state enforcement authority may avoid federal "strings" 
such as those EPA apparently is attempting to attach to the states' 
exercise of federal enforcement authority under the Medical Waste 
Tracking For example, independent state authority would 
avoid the problem of having to pay any assessed civil penalties to 
the Federal Treasury. 177 
, 
B. EPA Should Ensure that a State Has Developed and Has 
Authority to Implement a Reasonable Enforcement Strategy 
Before Authorizing a State to Carry Out the Enforcement 
Responsibility for a Federal Program 
Nearly all the major environmental programs require EPA to 
review the adequacy of state programs before granting enforce- 
ment responsibility to the states. The Emergency Planning Act 
and the Medical Waste Tracking Act do not require EPA approval 
of state programs, however. While the absence of federal approval 
requirement removes the burden of this approval process from 
states, EPA has little stake in a state enforcement program that it 
has not reviewed and found to be adequate. The result may be 
that EPA would feel unconstrained in filing an independent en- 
forcement action. To coordinate governmental enforcement re- 
sources effectively, it is important that EPA and the states work 
together to put iil place enforcement programs that allocate en- 
forcement responsibilities clearly rather than ones that leave open 
the possibility of potentially duplicative and disruptive indepen- 
dent enforcement actions. 
States wishing to assume enforcement responsibility for a 
federal program should be required to develop an enforcement 
strategy for each program for which they seek authorization. The 
EPA approval process should not involve a microscopic exami- 
nation of state authority. In particular, it should not require states 
to adopt enforcement authority and approaches that would mirror 
how EPA would proceed if it were managing the enforcement 
effort. Rather, the approval process should focus on whether the 
176. See supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text. 
177. The adoption of state enforcement authority would also avoid the possible 
constitutional issues raised under the Medical Waste Tracking Act scheme. Id. 
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state has developed a reasonable enforcement strategy for the 
program based on the types of regulated facilities in the state and 
the unique mix of statutory and common law enforcement author- 
ity available to the state.178 The strategy should lay out the state 
and federal enforcement authority that the state will utilize, the 
personnel and other resources that will be committed to enforcing 
the program requirements, the general strategy for achieving and 
maintaining compliance, and the criteria for measuring progress of 
the enforcement effort in obtaining compliance. 
C. Once a State Program Has Been Authorized to Carry Out a 
Federal Program, Most Enforcement Cases Should Be Handled 
by the State Without EPA Intervention 
Except for cases involving significant interstate impact and 
cases that have been referred to EPA by the state, a state should 
handle all enforcement cases without EPA intervention once the 
state program has been authorized. While the filing of a federal 
enforcement action in an authorized state may occasionally correct 
an inadequate enforcement action, the consequences of initiating 
a federal enforcement action, particularly an overfiling case, do 
not justify the continued exercise of this authority. Federal inter- 
vention introduces, uncertainty into state enforcement programs, 
results in duplicative enforcement efforts, drains the limited en- 
forcement resources available to both the state and federal gov- 
ernments, often disrupts the working relationship between states 
and EPA, and conflicts with the historical role of states in dealing 
with local environmental enforcement pr0b1ems.l~~ 
Further, there are at least two types of safeguards that mini- 
mize the impact of limiting EPA enforcement authority in an au- 
thorized state. First, most of the environmental statutes authorize 
citizen suits.1s0 These citizen suit provisions increasingly have been 
used to address cases where governmental enforcement has not 
proceeded on a timely basis. Second, EPA should retain the ability 
to withdraw program authorization where there has been a consis- 
178. See supra note 95. 
179. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. See also S. NOVIK, THE LAW OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 6.02131, at 6-19 to -20 (1989). 
180. See supra note 132. 
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tent pattern of inadequate enforcement. If EPA periodically ex- 
ercises the option of withdrawing state authorization when a state 
has consistently failed to pursue enforcement actions, the number 
of inadequate state enforcement actions should be minimized. 
Finally, given the huge enforcement workload, Congress and 
EPA must begin to view environmental enforcement as a true 
partnership effort. While the partnership terminology has long 
been used by EPA, the actual federal-state relationship has been 
closer to that of a parent watching over an unreliable child than a 
relationship of equals. If the federal government is to maintain a 
credible enforcement program to deal with the hundreds of thou- 
sands of regulated entities, it must trust the states to do an ade- 
quate job once the states are authorized to carry out a program. 
There simply are not adequate resources to approach the problem 
any other way. 
D. EPA Should Retain Authority to Bring Enforcement Actions 
in Cases Involving Significant Interstate Pollution 
States are often not in a good position to address enforcement 
problems involving more than one state for several reasons. The 
point of emission may be in a jurisdiction entirely separate and 
possibly remote from the several jurisdictions that are likely to 
experience the fallout.lS1 The jurisdiction that suffers the problem 
has little regulatory control over the emission. Further, the gov- 
ernment of the place where an emission originates may have little 
interest in dealing with the problem.Is2 As a result, the federal 
government is in a better position to deal with enforcement matters 
that involve multiple states. EPA should therefore retain enforce- 
ment authority in cases involving significant interstate pollution 
impact. 
Because many enforcement problems may 'involve some in- 
terstate impact, a set of criteria for determining whether a case 
has significant interstate' importance should be developed by EPA 
and the states. The criteria should also include a system for a state 
to provide early notice to EPA about violations that have the 
potential to cause significant interstate impact. Similarly, EPA 
181. See 1 F. GRAD, supra note 1, § 1.03, at 1-20. 
182. Id. 8 1.04, at 1-22 to -23. 
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should be required to notify a state of violations EPA believes 
have the potential to cause significant interstate impact. Finally, 
EPA should decide as early as possible in the process whether it 
wishes to assume full responsibility for an enforcement action to 
avoid duplicative efforts and to minimize disruptions to the state 
enforcement program. 
E. States Should Be Able to Refer Certain Enforcement Cases 
to EPA 
EPA's enforcement strategy under both RCRA and the Emer- 
gency Planning Act specifically provides for referral of cases to 
EPA.Is3 If their programs have been authorized, states should be 
able to handle most enforcement cases. However, the availability 
of a referral process is important for a limited set of cases. 
First, there may be some cases that involve complex technical 
issues that EPA is better equipped to handle. Second, if a case is 
extraordinarily large, a smaller state may not have the resources 
necessary to carry out the enforcement action. Finally, in some 
cases states may be placed in a difficult political position. For 
example, if a large employer in an economically distressed area of 
a state has committed serious violations, it may be difficult in 
some states to proceed vigorously against the company. The ability 
to refer the matter to EPA could remove the state enforcement 
officials from this problematic situation. 
The conditions under which a referral can be made and will 
be accepted should be clearly articulated. EPA and the states 
should jointly develop referral criteria. 
F. Systems Used to Account for Progress in Enforcement 
Should Be Based on State Enforcement Strategies and Should 
Be Designed to Encourage Innovation By States 
A system of accounting for the progress of state enforcement 
efforts is necessary for several reasons. There is a national interest 
in the enforcement of all federal environmental programs. Thus, 
183. ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE POLICY, supra note 92, at 16; CERCLA Enforcement 
Strategy, supra note 142, at 9. 
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Congress has a right and an obligation to know how enforcement 
efforts are proceeding under the environmental programs it has 
enacted. Further, continued federal financial support of state en- 
forcement programs is needed. EPA should be able to assess 
whether the funds it is providing the states are being well managed. 
Finally, states themselves should have a system of measuring prog- 
ress in their enforcement efforts. 
Given the vast enforcement responsibilities of the states, the 
accountability system must encourage states to use all of their 
available enforcement tools to achieve high compliance rates. 
Thus, the system should be built from the bottom up, based on 
the enforcement strategies developed in each state. This approach 
contrasts with the EPA's current enforcement response policies, 
particularly in the RCRA program, which tend to dictate enforce- 
ment responses from the top down, focussing on the enforcement 
tools that EPA utilizes.Ig4 
The accountability system could continue to establish a target 
number of enforcement actions to be initiated each year. However, 
these targets should be established by each state based on the 
anticipated mix of enforcement tools that may be used. The state 
by state numbers could then be aggregated to help measure na- 
tionwide progress for Congress. Although target numbers of en- 
184. A study conducted by the Environmental Law Institute on RCRA enforcement 
concluded that: 
By focusing on how states address individual cases and by failing instead 
to examine the panoply of enforcement authorities available to a state agency 
to compel or leverage compliance settlement in all types of cases, as well as 
how those authorities are used and have been used by the state and how they 
are publicized to regulated industry, EPA has ignored that which may be the 
most significant aspect of the enforcement program-i.e., the existence of a 
credible, deterrent enforcement presence. Oversight should not be driven solely 
by the examination of the program on a case-by-case basis, but by an exami- 
nation of the strengths and weaknesses of the program as an entity. The 
question should not be whether the state agency has filed a particular prescribed 
enforcement action within the scheduled timeframe, but whether the agency is 
capable of swiftly and effectively leveraging compliance and stringent settle- 
ment orders or decrees (which include substantial sanctions) as a natural 
response to the overall enforcement presence established by the state. 
. . . . 
. . . [The RCRA oversight policy] instead encourages the initiation of 
cases that may actually divert the agency's resources from pursuing and main- 
taining an aggressive credible deterrent enforcement presence throughout the 
state by addressing the most pressing cases with its limited resources. 
STATE HAZARDOUS WASTE STUDY, supra note 20, at 102-05 (citations omitted). 
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forcement actions may help measure short-term accomplishments, 
the primary focus of the accountability system should be on in- 
dustry compliance.185 EPA should work with states to help develop 
meaningful measures of industry compliance that could be .incor- 
porated into state accountability systems. 
Finally, the accountability system should also be used to help 
identify and correct weaknesses in state programs. Annual state 
meetings with EPA should address training, technical assistance, 
funding and other needs that, if help were provided, could improve 
the performance of the state enforcement program. 
G. EPA Should Maintain a Credible Threat to Withdraw 
Authority from States Whose Implementation of Federal 
Programs is Consistently Inadequate 
The federal laws discussed in this Article represent a consen- 
sus on the need for establishing minimum federal environmental 
standards. Because of the massive workload, the flexibility of state 
enforcement programs, and the traditional role of states in enforc- 
ing environmental laws, states should ordinarily be authorized to 
enforce these laws if the state has an adequate enforcement pro- 
gram. However, if a state consistently fails to undertake adequate 
enforcement actions, the federal government should reassume pri- 
mary responsibility for enforcement. This authority is understand- 
185. A Government Accounting Office report observed that EPA's RCRA enforce- 
ment strategy is based on the premise that it is more appropriate to hold enforcement 
officials accountable for accomplishing activities, such as conducting inspections and taking 
enforcement actions, than for achieving actual compliance rates. See GOVERNMENT AC- 
COUNTING OFFICE, supra note 165, at 41. The report went on to conclude that: 
EPA's goal should be to achieve actual compliance and that compliance should 
be used to measure the effectiveness of EPA's RCRA enforcement program. 
Oversight of the inspectors and other accountability measures may be neces- 
sary to make sure that enforcement officials discover and address violations, 
and a goal based on actual compliance may need to be reduced to reflect 
changing requirements or the technical complexity and difficulty involved. 
However, actual compliance is an important measure of performance. Other- 
wise, enforcement officials may have little incentive to take the types of en- 
forcement action necessary to get facilities back into actual compliance and 
deter future violations. 
Id. at 43. 
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ably difficult to utilize.lg6 Establishing a clear set of standards for 
program withdrawal, in consultation with states, would assist in 
dealing with the inevitable political battles that would result from 
withdrawal of federal authorization. 
Under the approach suggested in this Article, EPA should be 
more aggressive in withdrawing approval if there has been a con- 
sistent pattern of inadequate enforcement. By retaining and using 
this authority, EPA would maintain an incentive for states to carry 
out reasonable enforcement activities and preserve the integrity of 
the underlying regulatory programs. While program withdrawal 
would be disruptive to federal-state relationships, it nevertheless 
provides an incentive for maintaining an adequate state program 
and avoids the introduction of uncertainties in the enforcement 
process that are inherent in concurrent jurisdiction situations. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The allocation of enforcement responsibility between the state 
and federal government has varied dramatically in different sta- 
tutory programs enacted over the past twenty years. These vari- 
ations appear to have occurred as a result of short-term environ- 
mental and resource problems rather than in response to any set 
of principles concerning the appropriate role of each level of gov- 
ernment. In the past, when the environmental enforcement work- 
load was smaller, a clear allocation of enforcement responsibilities 
was perhaps less important. Today, faced with the task of assuring 
that a huge universe of regulated facilities is complying with en- 
vironmental laws, neither federal nor state officials can afford the 
confusion, delay, disputes, and duplicative enforcement efforts 
that result when the roles of various governmental entities are not 
clearly and consistently laid out. Further, after twenty years, en- 
vironmental enforcement programs should now be mature enough 
to be governed by a stable set of principles. Therefore, as Congress 
enacts or reauthorizes environmental laws in the future, and as 
EPA develops new environmental enforcement policies, they 
should do so utilizing allocation principles such as those suggested 
by this Article. The result will be more effective and more efficient 
enforcement of our nation's environmental laws. 
186. The sanction of program withdrawal has never been exercised by EPA. See S. 
NOVIK, supra note 179, f 6.02131, at 6-19. 
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